UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-31-2018

State v. Andersen Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45042

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"State v. Andersen Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45042" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All.
7125.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7125

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 45042
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
) Kootenai County Case No.
v.
) CR-2016-19399
)
BRIANNA NICOLE ANDERSEN,
)
)
Defendant-Respondent.
)
)
________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
________________________
HONORABLE BENJAMIN R. SIMPSON
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................1
I.

The District Court Erred In Partially Granting
Andersen’s Suppression Motion ..................................................................1

II.

The District Court Erred By Concluding
Andersen’s Statements Were Not Voluntary ...............................................5

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) ...................................................................... 5
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) .......................................................... 1, 3, 4, 5
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) ....................................................................... 6
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ...................................................................1, 5, 6
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) ........................................................................ 1
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) .............................................................. 6
State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 908 P.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1995) .......................................... 6
State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 963 P.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1998) .............................................. 6
State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 362 P.3d 551 (Ct. App. 2015) ............................................. 5
State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 225 P.3d 1169 (2010) ........................................................ 1
State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 304 P.3d 304 (Ct. App. 2013) .................................... passim

ii

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Partially Granting Andersen’s Suppression Motion
The district court granted Andersen’s motion to suppress in part as to her
statements, finding that she “was rather forcefully told to sit down and stay,” and that
“based upon that, she was in custody.” (03/16/2017 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 1-2.) The court
therefore suppressed “all of her statements made to law enforcement after that fact or
after that statement.” (03/16/2017 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 3-6.)
This was an error. A detention—even forcefully articulated—does not necessarily
rise to the level of custody equivalent to an arrest. Instead, the test for whether an
individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda 1 is whether, in light of all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, there was a “‘formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” See California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495
(1977)). A person who is detained, while not “free to leave,” is not necessarily in custody
for purposes of Miranda. State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 32, 304 P.3d 304, 307 (Ct. App.
2013) (“The freedom-of-movement inquiry is, however, only a necessary and not a
sufficient condition for Miranda custody.”). To determine whether a defendant was in
custody, courts therefore “must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation,” and it is the defendant’s burden to show custody for the purposes of
Miranda. Id. (emphasis added); State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172
(2010).
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Andersen responds that “[c]onsidering the number and nature of the questions
asked, the presence of multiple officers, and the forceful and repetitive nature of the
questioning, it is clear Ms. Andersen was subjected to a custodial interrogation.”
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-9.) She avers that, “[m]ost tellingly,” she twice attempted to
stand, and “was twice instructed to stay seated,” and that consequently “her freedom of
movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (Respondent’s
brief, p. 9.)
But Andersen fails, first of all, to show that this comprehensive analysis was the
analysis the district court actually performed. In its custody analysis, the district court did
not look to the number of questions that were asked, or “the presence of multiple
officers,” or the repetitiveness of the questioning. (See 03/16/2017 Tr., p. 4, L. 23 – p. 5,
L. 6.) Nor did the court look to a variety of other factors identified by courts examining
the totality of circumstances showing custodial arrest. (Compare 03/16/2017 Tr., p. 4, L.
23 – p. 5, L. 6 with Silver, 155 Idaho at 34-35, 304 P.3d at 309-10 (looking to whether
law enforcement drew weapons; whether the defendant was placed in a police car;
whether the defendant was handcuffed; whether the defendant was told the detention
would be more than temporary; whether the detention took place in a “publicly visible
location”; and the length of the detention)).
Instead of looking at the totality of the circumstances, the court here explicitly
found, based solely on the “rather forceful[]” instruction to “sit down and stay,” that
Andersen was in custody:
Okay. The Court finds from a review of the CD at time stamp 1550
approximately, the defendant attempted to get up during the interview. She
was rather forcefully told to sit down and stay. The Court finds based
2

upon that, she was in custody. Based upon that, I’m going to suppress all
of her statements made to law enforcement after that fact or after that
statement. So those will not be used against her.
(03/16/2017 Tr., p. 4, L. 23 – p. 5, L. 6 (emphasis added).)
As a result, Andersen has failed to show the court applied the proper test. The
court looked to one factor which would have been sufficient to show a detention—and
could have been relevant to the custody inquiry—but which was insufficient on its own to
show custody. Because courts “must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation,” and the district court explicitly based its ruling on a single factor, it erred.
Silver, 155 Idaho at 32, 304 P.3d at 307 (emphasis added); -see --also -----Beheler, 463 U.S. at
1125.
Second, even if the district court’s holding was somehow implicitly based on “the
number and nature of the questions asked, the presence of multiple officers, and the
forceful and repetitive nature of the questioning” (Respondent’s brief, p. 8), Andersen
failed to meet her burden below to show these factors created the equivalent of a custodial
arrest.
In this case Andersen was forcefully told to sit, during a mutually heated
discussion with two officers who had been questioning her for some 15 minutes, while
other officers walked in and out of the room, occasionally engaging in the conversation.
(See Video Ex., 02:52-15:59.)

Andersen was not handcuffed, physically restrained,

placed in a police car, or transported to a police station.

(See id.)

Under these

circumstances an objective observer would not think Andersen was under arrest. And
while Andersen presents a compelling case that she was detained, she does not show that
this particular detention was the equivalent of a formal arrest. Consequently, even if the
3

district court did consider all of the factors at issue here, Andersen fails to meet her
burden to show that based on these factors, she was in a custodial interrogation.
Andersen also appears to suggest, apparently in the alternative, that even if the
district court relied on a single factor in concluding Andersen was in custody, it did not
err:
In a close case, the district court might be expected to discuss in some
detail the various factors weighing in favor of, or against, a finding of
custody. But this was not a close case. The fact that Ms. Andersen was, in
the district court’s words, “rather forcefully told to sit down and stay,” is
certainly relevant to, and perhaps all but determinative of, a finding that
she was subjected to a custodial interrogation.”
(Respondent’s brief, p. 9 (quoting 03/16/17 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 1-12, emphasis added).)
This argument fails.

Assuming that a single factor showing a detention is

“perhaps all but determinative” of custodial interrogation reveals that Andersen, like the
district court, is applying the test for detention, and not custodial interrogation. While a
single factor could show a detention, it could not be “all but determinative” of the custody
question, because detention alone is insufficient to show custody, and the court “must
consider all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” to determine whether the
defendant was in custody. Silver, 155 Idaho at 32, 304 P.3d at 307; -see --also -----Beheler, 463
U.S. at 1125. Because the district court relied entirely on a single insufficient factor
rather than the totality of the circumstances, it erred, and Andersen only repeats the error
in her response.
Moreover, declaring that this was a “close case”—and one therefore exempt from
a thorough analysis of all the factors—begs the question. Whether or not this is a “close
case” depends on whether or not Andersen was in custody. And that depends on a multi-
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factor inquiry. Avoiding a review of all of the factors based on the “closeness of the
case” amounts to skipping the correct analysis because the answer has already been
presumed. 2
Properly resolving the custody question, on the other hand, requires an inquiry
into all of the circumstances. Silver, 155 Idaho at 32, 304 P.3d at 307, -see --also -----Beheler,
463 U.S. at 1125. To the extent the district court did not consider all the factors it should
have, it erred. Moreover, because the correct application of the law to the facts shows
that Andersen was not in custody, this was a reversible error.
Andersen failed to meet her burden below to show that her freedom of movement
was restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Because Andersen was only
detained, was not in a custodial interrogation, the district court erred by suppressing her
statements under Miranda.
II.
The District Court Erred By Concluding Andersen’s Statements Were Not Voluntary
The use of a defendant’s involuntary statements against the defendant violates the
due process clause. State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 485-86, 362 P.3d 551, 560-61 (Ct.
App. 2015). “In determining whether a statement was involuntary, the inquiry is whether
the defendant’s will was overborne by police coercion.”

2

Id. (citing Arizona v.

And on the subject of “close cases,” one can readily imagine closer cases than this one.
Andersen could have been handcuffed, otherwise physically restrained, subjected to an
interrogation over hours, placed in a police car, taken to the police station, and so on. C.f.
Silver, 155 Idaho at 34–35, 304 P.3d at 309–10 (examining whether factors such as these
were present there). All of these facts would create a far closer case that Andersen had
been restrained to a degree associated with an arrest. Because none of these things
happened here, Andersen has failed to show this was a close case at all, much less one
that is so close that forsaking the proper analysis would be excusable.
5

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 177 (1986);
State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 713, 963 P.2d 392, 396 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Davila, 127
Idaho 888, 892, 908 P.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1995 In determining the voluntariness of a
confession, courts consider the characteristics of the accused and the interrogation itself,
including whether Miranda warnings were given; the accused’s age, education and
intelligence; the length of the detention and whether it was repeated or prolonged; and
whether the accused was deprived of food or sleep. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 226 (1973).
As the state argued in its opening briefing, the district court erred by looking to a
single, insufficient factor—the “fairly forceful,” yet progressively “more conversational”
tone of the questioning—to determine that Andersen’s admissions were involuntary.
(03/16/2017 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-23.) This was an error because the court did not address,
much less rely on, any other of the coercive factors identified in Schneckloth. (See
03/16/2017 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-23.) Moreover, a fairly forceful, increasingly conversational
dialogue would not have been an involuntary confession.
Andersen argues in response that “the initially forceful nature of the encounter is
clearly not the only factor the district court considered”:
As discussed above, the district court reviewed the video recording of the
incident and the transcript of the preliminary hearing prior to the
suppression hearing. (3/16/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.14-16.) The district court
reached its decision based on more than just the initial disposition of the
officers. Defense counsel argued to the district court that Ms. Andersen
answered the officers’ questions “because she felt threatened by [them].”
(3/16/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-16.)
(Respondent’s brief, p. 12 (brackets in original).)
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However, this argument, sentence by sentence, fails to show the district court
relied on anything but the “forceful nature” of the conversation. Sentence one simply
shows the district court reviewed the video recording; but it does not show which facts
the court relied on. Sentence two—explaining that “the district court reached its decision
based on more than just the initial disposition of the officers”—conspicuously lacks any
citation to the record, and fails to mention exactly what “more” it was that the district
court based its decision on. And sentence three only reflects the argument that Andersen
made to the district court—not what the district court itself thought.
Of course, the best evidence of the district court’s analysis is what the district
court said. And the court made it plain that it was considering only the “fairly forceful”
nature of the conversation to determine Andersen’s confessions were involuntary:
I think initially [the officers] were fairly forceful. The farther they went
into it, the more conversational it became. But I’m going to find that her
statements were not voluntary. They’re not useful for any purpose. They’re
constitutionally prohibited.
(03/16/2017 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-23 (emphasis added).) It is clear that the court did not rely
on any other facts in summarily arriving at this conclusion. And it is just as clear that this
was an error: a “fairly forceful,” increasingly “conversational” exchange would not be
enough to show that Andersen’s statements were involuntarily made.
Finally, Andersen argues “[t]he State does not cite any authority for the
proposition that a person’s will cannot be overborne when they are yelled at only briefly,
or when they respond to yelling by yelling.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 12.)
The authority that supports this proposition is a common-sense application of the
legal standard: if someone is being yelled at, and responds by yelling back instead of
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demurring, that is good evidence that their will has not been “overborne” by coercion. It
is self-evident that when someone reciprocates to forceful yelling with forceful yelling of
their own, that they are freely exercising their willpower by responding in kind. In other
words, the fact that Andersen forcefully spoke for herself, speaks for itself.
An initially forceful, progressively conversational exchange, with no other
coercive factors identified by the court or shown by the evidence, fails to show
Andersen’s will was overborne or her statements were involuntary. The district erred by
concluding Andersen’s statements were involuntary and constitutionally prohibited.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the order of the district court and
remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2018.

/s/ Kale D. Gans______________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of January, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT by emailing an electronic
copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kale D. Gans____________________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
KDG/dd
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